The independent commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on Thursday released a report giving a detailed timeline of the attacks and played radio transmissions by the hijackers, providing a chilling portrait of the attacks that killed about 3,000 people.

In a report issued before its last final public hearing, the panel said confusion and poor coordination at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) led to delays in scrambling fighter jets to intercept any of the four hijacked planes.

"NORAD and the FAA were unprepared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001," the report said. "They struggled, under difficult circumstances, to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never encountered and had never trained to meet."

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 11

At 8:00 a.m. on Sept. 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 bound for Los Angeles began its takeoff roll at Logan Airport in Boston. A Boeing 767, Flight 11 carried 81 passengers and 11 crew members.

At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the available information about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane. At this point, neither the controller nor his supervisor suspected a hijacking.

The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and searched from aircraft to aircraft in an effort to have another pilot contact American 11.

At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11: "We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be O.K. We are returning to the airport. The controller did not hear the specific words "we have some planes."

Then the next transmission came seconds later: "Nobody move. Everything will be O.K. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet."

The voice was believed to be that of Mohamed Atta, the alleged leader of the 19 hijackers. Hearing that, the controller knew it was a hijacking and alerted his supervisor.

Between 8:25 and 8:32, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Center managers started notifying their chain of command that American 11 had been hijacked. At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission from American 11: "Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves."

Boston Center tried to obtain assistance from a former alert site in Atlantic City, New Jersey, unaware it had been phased out.

At 8:37:52, the Boston Center reached the military's North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS). This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked.

After confirming it was not an exercise, NEADS promptly ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base, about 153 miles away from New York City, starting the air defense of America.

The F-15 fighters were ordered scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base, but NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft. Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the elusive primary radar return.

American 11 hit the World Trade Center's North Tower at 8:46:40. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate American 11, word about the crash reached them. The fighters were brought down to military air space to "hold as needed" from 9:08 to 9:13.

"In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it impacted the north tower. The nine minutes notice was the most the military would receive that morning of any of the four hijackings," the report said.

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175

The second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767 carrying 65 passengers from Boston to Los Angeles, took off from Logan Airport at 8:14.

At 8:41, United 175 entered New York Center's airspace. The controller responsible for United 175 was the same controller assigned the job of tracking the hijacked American 11.

At 8:47, at almost the same time American 11 crashed into the North Tower, United 175's assigned transponder code changed, then changed again. These changes were not noticed for several minutes, because the controller was focused on finding American 11, which had disappeared.

At 8:48, a New York Center manager reported to a Command Center teleconference that one of American Airlines' stewardesses was stabbed, unaware that American 11 had already hit the tower.

At 8:51, the controller noticed the change in the transponder reading from United 175 and made repeated attempts to reach the crew of United 175. He contacted another controller at 8:53, and worried that "we may have a hijack" and that he could not find the aircraft.

At approximately 8:55, the controller-in-charge notified a New York Center manager that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that the managers were discussing a hijacked aircraft (presumably American 11) and refused to be disturbed.

Between 9:01 and 9:02, a manager from New York Center told the Command Center in Herndon: "We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us . . . We have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here, " referring to United 175.

This conversation was the only notice received prior to the second crash by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center that there was a second hijack. At 9:03:02, United 175 crashed into the South Tower.

At 9:05, New York Center declared "ATC zero" - meaning that aircraft were not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through New York Center's airspace until further notice.

Within minutes of the second crash, Boston Center's Operations Manager instructed all air traffic controllers in his center to use the radio frequencies to inform all aircraft in Boston Center of the events unfolding in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert to all aircraft nationwide.

"We have found no evidence to suggest that Command Center managers instructed any Centers to issue a cockpit security alert," the panel report said.

The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03, at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower. A Combat Air Patrol was established over the city at 9:25.

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77

Down south, American Airlines Flight 77 began its takeoff roll from Dulles International Airport outside Washington at 8:20. The flight was handed off routinely from Washington Center to Indianapolis Center at approximately 8:40.

At 8:54, American 77 began deviating from its flight plan, first with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later it disappeared completely from Indianapolis radar. The controller tracking American 77 searched along its projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared.

The controller tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this point, the controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical and/or mechanical failure, and crashed.

Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed.

At 9:08, Indianapolis Center contacted Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and told them to look out for a downed aircraft. At 9:09, they reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24.

By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft in the system, and began to doubt their initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost.

Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for eight minutes and thirteen seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, the report said.

According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 re-emerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The managers did not instruct other controllers to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.

"While the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an 'all points bulletin' to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets," the report said.

American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, DC. At 9:32, several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking

eastbound at a high rate of speed." Reagan Airport controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft to identify the suspicious aircraft. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to Washington Tower: "Looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon sir."

After receiving a mistaken FAA information that American Airlines 11 was still airborne and heading toward Washington, the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS issued an order at 9:23 to

scramble fighters at Langley Air Force Base. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York and send the Langley fighters to the Baltimore area, which was near Washington.

NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS that American 77 was also missing.

The time was 9:34.

"This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance... No one at FAA Command Center or headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77," the report said.

At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and reported that it had discovered an unidentified plane was just six miles southeast of the White House. The NEADS ordered the Langley fighters to fly to the White House. The fighters were approximately 150 miles away when the Pentagon was struck by American 77 at 9:37:46.

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93

United 93 took off from Newark, New Jersey, at 8:42, after a delay of more than 40 minutes. At 9:28, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with United 93.

Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin .. "

The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?" This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming and someone yelling "Get out of here, get out of here," again from an unknown source.

The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet. The controller attempted again to contact United 93 several times, with no response.

At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters.

FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of communication with the Command Center at Herndon and instructed it to poll all the Centers about suspect aircraft. The Command Center executed the request and, a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that "United 93 may have a bomb on board." That was the information Command Center relayed to FAA headquarters at 9:34.

Between 9:34 and 9:38, the controller observed United 93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out of its way. The controller continued to try to contact United 93, and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response.

Then, at 9:39, a fifth radio transmission came over the radio frequency from United 93: "Uh, is the captain. Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet."

At about 9:36, Cleveland Center offered to contact a nearby military base. Command Center replied that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make that decision and were working the issue.

At 9:42, Command Center learned from television news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon. The Command Center's National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA

facilities to instruct all airborne aircraft to land at the nearest airport.

"The air traffic control system handled it with great skill, as about 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident," the report said.

United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from Washington, DC.

"Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military," the report said.

NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07, unaware that the aircraft had already crashed. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.

DECISION-MAKERS IN WASHINGTON HAVING NO PERFECT INFORMATION

"On the morning of 9/11 there was no one decision-maker in Washington with perfect information," the panel report said. "Various people had various pieces of information, and they were in different locations."

President George W. Bush was initially at an elementary school in Florida, and after being told of the hijacking, was flied to Louisiana. At the White House, other decision-makers gathered in either the White House Situation Room or the underground shelter.

When American 11 struck the World Trade Center at 8:46, no one in the White House or traveling with Bush knew that it had been hijacked. Immediately afterward, duty officers at the White House and Pentagon began notifying senior officials what had happened.

Even within FAA, the Administrator, Jane Garvey, and her deputy had not been told of a confirmed hijacking before they learned from television that a plane had crashed.

When they learned a second plane had struck the World Trade Center, nearly everyone in the White House said they immediately knew it was not an accident. The Secret Service initiated a number of security enhancements around the White House Complex.

The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multi-agency teleconference before 9:30. The FAA, following its protocol, set up a hijacking teleconference at approximately 9:20 with several agencies, including the Defense Department.

"However, FAA and Defense Department participants in this teleconference told us the call played no role in coordinating the military and FAA response to the attacks of 9/11," the report said.

The Defense Department initiated a key teleconference that started at 9:29. This teleconference lasted over eight hours, with Bush, Cheney and other senior officials attending at various points in the day. The FAA did not join the call until 10:17 because of an equipment problem and the FAA representative had no familiarity with or responsibility for a hijack situation, had no access to decision-makers, and had none of the information available to senior FAA officials by that time.

"We found no evidence that, at this critical time, during the morning of September 11, NORAD's top commanders, in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, ever coordinated with their counterparts at FAA headquarters to improve situational awareness and organize a common response, " the report said.

At 9:59, an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel working in the White House Military Office joined the conference and stated that the White House had requested the implementation of continuity of government measures, fighter escorts for Air Force One, and the establishment of a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, DC.

After hearing that a second plane hit the second tower, Bush remained in the classroom for another five to seven minutes, while the children continued reading. He then returned to a holding room shortly before 9:15, where he was briefed by staff and saw television coverage. He decided to make a brief statement from the school before leaving for the airport.

After boarding the aircraft, Bush asked the Secret Service about the safety of his family, and called Cheney. According to notes of the call, at about 9:45 Bush told Cheney: "Sounds like we have a minor war going on here, I heard about the Pentagon. We're at war...somebody's going to pay."

All witnesses interviewed by the 9/11 panel agreed that Bush strongly wanted to return to Washington and only grudgingly agreed to go elsewhere. Air Force One departed at approximately 9:55, with no destination at take-off. The objective was to get up in the air-as fast and as high as possible-and then decide where to go.

The panel report said Bush emphasized in interviews that he had authorized the shoot down of hijacked aircraft in a telephone conversation with Cheney, but there was no documentary evidence for the call. Others near Cheney at that time were either busy taking notes or did not notice the call.

Told that the United 93 was 80 miles away from Washington, unaware that the plane had already crashed in Pennsylvania, Cheney was asked for authority to shoot down the aircraft. He authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. Cheney told the 9/11 panel later that the decision was based on his prior conversation with Bush.